Category: Strategy

Padi UMKM — A Complexity Case

When I first designed what later became Padi UMKM, I did not do it in a boardroom. I did it at home, during long months of WFH in the middle of the Covid-19 pandemic. I drew the system on papers spread on the floor. At that time, my head was full of ideas about ecosystems, complexity theory, and complexity economics. I was not thinking about building another digital platform. I was thinking about how economic coordination itself breaks down under systemic shock, and how new coordination patterns might emerge when old ones collapse. In that sense, Padi UMKM was born less from a product mindset than from an ecosystem mindset, with complexity theory consciously in the background.

When the pandemic hit, what collapsed was not only the economy. What collapsed was the coordination logic of the economy. Supply chains broke, demand evaporated, SMEs lost access to markets, and institutions discovered that their standard operating procedures were designed for stability, not for systemic disruption. Many organisations reacted by accelerating digital projects, launching platforms, and optimising internal processes. That helped, but it did not address the deeper problem. The economic ecosystem itself had lost its organising structure. Actors that were rational in isolation could no longer produce coherent outcomes collectively. This is how complex systems behave under stress: when established coordination patterns fail, local rationality no longer aggregates into systemic order.

Padi UMKM did not start as a brilliant digital product idea. It started as a response to a coordination failure across a fragmented system of SOEs, SMEs, banks, regulators, ministries, and development agencies. All were acting with good intentions, yet through incompatible logics, timelines, and mandates. The system was not short of initiatives; it was short of coherence. In complexity terms, the economy had been pushed far from equilibrium, and the challenge was not optimisation but reorganisation. What was needed was not another tool, but a new pattern of interaction among heterogeneous agents.

The real innovation of Padi UMKM was therefore not the platform. The platform was the easy part. The digital workforce of Telkom Group can design platforms; that is an operational capability. The platform was necessary, and it became the core infrastructure of the ecosystem, but it was not the breakthrough. The breakthrough was the deliberate redefinition of roles within the economic system. SOEs must reposition their procurement operation into a capability of creating new market, i.e. an SME-based market structure. SMEs were not framed as beneficiaries of aid, but as economic agents that could be structurally integrated into formal procurement and value creation. Banks and financial institutions were not treated merely as lenders, but as part of an enabling architecture that combined financing with capability development and pathways to export. What changed was not a feature set. What changed was the pattern of interaction between economic actors.

The formal launching of Padi UMKM itself was not initiated by Telkom or by the Ministry of SOEs. It was planned within the nationwide BBI (Bangga Buatan Indonesia) program, because the central government needed a real, executable instrument to accelerate domestic economic circulation under crisis. Telkom showed a commitment to develop the platform, even though it was still imperfect at that time. The urgency was national, not corporate. This matters, because it positioned Padi UMKM from the beginning not as a corporate product launch, but as a systemic intervention embedded in a national recovery narrative. The early external promotion of Padi UMKM, beyond the internal SOE environment, was also driven by the BBI program. Over time, almost by systemic selection rather than by design, Padi UMKM became the de facto e-commerce infrastructure for BBI, as other platforms could not fit the specific institutional and ecosystemic roles required by the program.

From the beginning, we made a counterintuitive choice in the way the system was governed. Telkom deliberately limited its role to being the product and platform owner. The ecosystem itself was not branded as Telkom’s program. The community was symbolically owned by the Ministry of SOEs and by SOEs collectively. Even the name Padi UMKM did not originate from Telkom. This was not a political compromise; it was a strategic design choice grounded in complexity thinking. In complex systems, ecosystems tend to collapse when one actor over-claims ownership. When the platform owner also claims to own the ecosystem, other actors reduce their commitment, hedge their participation, or quietly resist. By stepping back from symbolic ownership, Telkom created space for other institutions to step forward. The platform provided the infrastructure, but the legitimacy of the ecosystem was deliberately distributed across actors.

At some point, something structurally interesting happened. The initiative crossed a threshold where no single actor could kill it anymore. The CEO of Telkom could not simply shut it down because the ecosystem had become institutionally embedded beyond Telkom. The Minister of SOEs could not dismantle it easily because it had become part of the official narrative of national economic recovery. The President could not disown it because it had been publicly positioned as a success story through BBI, PEN, and related programs. This was not political theatre. This was the moment when the system acquired path dependence. Once an initiative becomes embedded across multiple layers of institutional narrative and governance, it ceases to be a project and becomes part of the system itself. At that point, you are no longer managing a prograe. You are dealing with a living economic structure.

Value in Padi UMKM did not come from transactions alone. It emerged from the coupling of multiple layers of interaction. Transactions between SOEs and SMEs were reinforced by access to credit, by certification mechanisms that enabled formal participation, by development programmes that upgraded SME capabilities, and by pathways to export markets. None of these elements, on their own, would have been transformative. The transformation emerged from their interaction. This is how complex economies create value: not through linear pipelines, but through ecosystems in which different forms of capital, i.e. financial, institutional, social, and operational, reinforce one another over time.

Internally in Telkom, there was a structural separation of roles that proved critical. The Digital Business Directorate (DDB) operated at the product and business level. Its logic was operational: build, run, scale, monetise, and maintain the platform. Even as the platform owner and economic keystone, it remained only one agent within the broader ecosystem. In parallel, the Synergy Subdirectorate under the Strategic Portfolio Directorate worked at the ecosystem level. This role was not about features, roadmaps, or KPIs. It was about sensing emergent patterns of collaboration, mediating conflicts between institutions, and navigating collisions between policy signals and organisational incentives. In the early phase, the Synergy team also played a foundational role in organising cross-SOE agreements, preparing the multi-actor launch, embedding Padi UMKM within the BBI program, and connecting it with multiple SME build-up initiatives involving the Ministry of SMEs, the Ministry of Trade, and other institutions. This work was not linear project management; it was ecosystem orchestration under uncertainty.

In Indonesia’s context, the interaction between SOEs, SMEs, banks, and regulators is not merely complex; it is quasi-chaotic. Mandates overlap, incentives conflict, and policies evolve at different speeds and under different political pressures. In such an environment, precise prediction is an illusion. What becomes possible instead is navigation: sensing where constructive patterns of emergence are forming, dampening destructive feedback loops before they escalate, and shaping the boundaries within which the ecosystem evolves. This is not classical management. This is leadership under complexity.

As a result of its early success, there was a moment when the government, again through the BBI programme, asked to expand Padi UMKM to cover all government agencies (K/L/PD). On paper, this looked like success, with an enormous projected GMV. In reality, it carried a systemic risk. Full integration into the broader government procurement apparatus would have imposed rigid compliance structures and administrative constraints that could have frozen the adaptive dynamics that made the ecosystem work. The decision to return that expansion to LKPP, while positioning Telkom only as a platform provider for LKPP, was a deliberate choice to preserve modularity and flexibility over symbolic scale. In complex systems, scale without adaptability is not growth; it is fragility disguised as success.

What this experience ultimately taught us is uncomfortable for traditional management thinking. In complex economic ecosystems, you cannot engineer outcomes. You can only design conditions: boundaries, incentives, roles, and narratives that make constructive emergence more likely than destructive collapse. The platform mattered. The technology mattered. But what mattered more was the humility to accept that once an ecosystem becomes alive, you are no longer the architect standing outside the system. You are one of the agents operating within it.

The strategic lesson for C-level leadership is this. In times of systemic disruption, competitive advantage no longer lies primarily in having the most sophisticated product or the fastest execution. It lies in the capability to shape interaction spaces across institutions, sectors, and policy domains. Leadership shifts from control to stewardship. Strategy shifts from optimisation to navigation. And success is no longer measured only by ownership, but by whether the system you helped catalyse can survive, adapt, and continue to create value even when you step back.

That, ultimately, is what Padi UMKM represents. Not a digital product success story, but a case of how leadership, strategy, and technology can be recomposed to operate effectively in a complex, adaptive economy under crisis. It is an ecosystem in motion. It is Synergy in action.

Navigating Business at the Edge of Chaos

This is a speech preparation for the CIMA & AICPA Strategic Leaders Breakfast Talk, to be held in mid-February 2026, under the theme ‘Leadership in the Age of Disruption — Strategic Leadership for Modern Finance Professionals’. I will deliver the presentation from the perspective of complexity science and complexity economics, before exploring the practical implementations for management accounting professionals.

In current economic landscape, business must be perceived as the development of an ecosystem that operates as a complex adaptive system (CAS). Within this framework, autonomous agents, both internal to the firm and across broader business networks, possess the capacity for independent decision-making and activity. From this complexity perspective, phenomena such as VUCA (Volatility, Uncertainty, Complexity, and Ambiguity) and disruption are no longer viewed as external threats to be mitigated or overcome. Instead, they are recognised as engines of evolution and qualitative opportunities to redesign business architecture. Strategy shifts from the mere optimisation of saturated, linear models toward the cultivation of dynamic ecosystems that generate new value through the process of emergence.

The optimal zone for such innovation is the Edge of Chaos, which is a critical transition state where a system balances order and stability with disorder and change. It is precisely in this zone, rather than in a state of total equilibrium, where optimal innovation occurs. For the modern enterprise, the Edge of Chaos is not a threat to be avoided, but a strategic space to be occupied and, if necessary, intentionally created. Competitive advantage in this regime is defined not by scale or static efficiency, but by architectural flexibility and the velocity of learning in response to constant internal and external feedback loops.

Leadership within this complex environment requires a fundamental shift in identity toward that of an ecologist. The leader’s primary duty is no longer the top-down control of outputs, but the creation of conditions and cultures that enable teams to self-organise. This involves managing the delicate tension at the Edge of Chaos, introducing enough healthy friction to trigger innovation without descending into systemic anarchy. Rigid & brittle SOPs are replaced by simple rules or heuristics that guide autonomous decision-making amidst ambiguity. Leaders must facilitate safe-to-fail probing, i.e. launching multiple, simultaneous, low-cost experiments to detect strategic signals and opportunities that traditional analytical models inevitably miss.

Strategic management in the exponential era demands ambidextrous design, balancing the exploitation of core operations with the continuous exploration of new ventures through modular structures. This necessitates the orchestration of resources far beyond traditional organisational boundaries, incorporating partners, start-ups, and regulators into platform-based strategies. Strategy is viewed as a process of co-evolution, where the organisation constantly reinvents itself to remain congruent with a shifting environment.

Finally, Management Accounting (MA) serves as the vital navigation instrument in this journey through the Strategic Planning for Exponential Era (SPX) framework. MA must evolve to support dynamic feasibility, utilising Real Options Analysis to value investments as strategic options—the right to expand, delay, or pivot—rather than rigid, one-way capital bets. This implementation includes Agile Capital Budgeting, where funds are allocated to strategic “buckets” rather than granular, unproven projects. By abandoning the stagnation of rigid annual budgets in favour of Rolling Forecasts and Throughput Accounting, MA ensures that resource allocation is driven by real-time feedback and the velocity of value conversion. Ultimately, the most profound business developments are market-creating innovations that not only ensure sustainability but actively uplift the economy and quality of life for society

Synergy Value as Emergence

When considering mergers, acquisitions, alliances, or even intra-group synergies, it is useful to shift our perspective away from additive arithmetic and towards the philosophy of emergence. In complex systems, including business ecosystems as complex adaptive systems, value does not reside solely within the parts; rather, it arises through the patterned interactions between them. This emergent phenomenon is precisely what in corporate finance is labelled synergy value. In formal terms, we may describe the total incremental value of a collaboration as

where V(x; G) denotes the value of the whole system, generated by the vector of resources and activities x under a specific governance structure G, and ∑V represents the value of each entity in isolation. The very fact that ΔV may be greater than zero testifies to emergence: complementarities in action, dependencies properly orchestrated, and adaptive patterns unfolding across the system.

The Levers of Emergent Synergy

Four principal levers determine whether emergent value materialises or evaporates. The first is complementarity, or what economists term supermodularity. This describes the situation in which activities reinforce each other such that the marginal return of undertaking one activity is enhanced by the undertaking of another; formally, the cross-partial derivatives are positive (𝛿²V/𝛿xi 𝛿xj > 0). It is here that the popular slogan “one plus one equals more than two” has rigorous grounding.

The second lever is the interdependence structure. Every collaboration has a topology of dependencies, where some assets act as complements, others as substitutes, and some nodes become bottlenecks through which the value of the entire system is channelled. In business ecosystems, mapping this structure is indispensable, for it often dictates whether modularity and flexible linkages suffice, or whether full absorption is required.

The third lever is defined by the adaptive rules of the system. A collaboration is not static; it is a complex adaptive system in which local decisions, feedback loops, and routines create new global patterns. Where local experimentation is permitted, and where feedback loops are properly designed, valuable behaviours diffuse through the organisation or alliance. Where rigidity prevails, the system is condemned to stasis, and synergy remains a theoretical promise rather than an emergent reality.

Finally, there is the matter of orchestration capacity. This refers to the dynamic capabilities of leadership—sensing opportunities, seizing them through resource allocation, and reconfiguring the system as environments change. Ashby’s principle of requisite variety reminds us that the variety of governance and decision-making tools must match the variety and volatility of the environment. Without adequate orchestration, even strong complementarities and favourable topologies may collapse under the weight of integration costs.

Applications Across Collaboration Types

In mergers and acquisitions, the choice of integration model should mirror the degree of interdependence. The celebrated Haspeslagh–Jemison framework reminds us that absorption is not always optimal; linkage or preservation may unlock more emergent value when autonomy is vital. The risk of the so-called synergy mirage lies precisely in misjudging complementarities and ignoring the time it takes for emergent patterns to stabilise. Thus, every acquisition is less a completed transaction than a hypothesis about the future, whose proof lies in the integration process.

In alliances and joint ventures, synergy takes the form of options on emergence. Here, limited commitments allow parties to test complementarities without over-committing capital. The collaborative form is well-suited to contexts of uncertainty, where exploration of emergent patterns is required. Ecosystem logic also applies: co-opetition and the management of network externalities often define the extent of emergent value.

For intra-group business synergy, emergence must be cultivated across corporate units. Here, Herbert Simon’s notion of near-decomposability becomes instructive: groups should design modular interfaces so that subsidiaries adapt locally yet align globally. To maintain cooperation, emergent rents must be shared fairly; cooperative game theory suggests the Shapley value as one method of allocating incremental value in proportion to each unit’s marginal contribution. Without such fairness, group members are tempted to defect, undermining the collaborative potential of the system.

Measuring and Governing Emergence

Because synergy is emergent, it resists simple enumeration. Yet it is not beyond the reach of disciplined measurement. One may begin with a complementarity map, estimating where cross-partials are most positive, and therefore where joint action may yield the greatest return. Alongside, an ecosystem dependency graph may be drawn, in the spirit of Ron Adner’s ecosystem mapping, to reveal missing complements and bottlenecks whose removal could unlock value.

Where uncertainty is high, the logic of real options should prevail. Pilot projects, staged investments, or minority stakes serve as options to explore emergent potential without risking catastrophic downside. Parallel to this, a system of synergy accounting may be implemented, in which incremental value is decomposed using Shapley allocations, thereby aligning incentives with marginal contributions to the whole.

The Philosophical Bottom Line

Synergy lives not in assets but in interactions. Corporate actions—whether a merger, an alliance, or an intra-group initiative—are best understood as interventions in a complex system. When complementarities are strong, interdependencies are designed with care, adaptive rules permit experimentation, and orchestration capacity is sufficient, emergent synergy is more than a hopeful metaphor; it becomes an observable reality. Conversely, where these levers are mismanaged, the promised “1 + 1 > 2” dissolves into disappointment, integration costs, and value destruction.

Thus, the philosophy of emergence, long a staple of complexity science, is not an academic curiosity but a practical guide to business collaboration. It teaches us that the true measure of a deal or alliance lies not in the parts themselves, but in the patterns of interaction that the collaboration enables.

The Flawed Global Ecosystem Strategy

Last century, the US stood as the pinnacle of industrial power. With unmatched manufacturing capacity, cutting-edge innovation, and a dynamic domestic labour force, the US not only produced at scale, but also created a vast middle class through industrial employment. But since the early 21st century, this dominance had eroded. Despite the continued global success of Apple, Microsoft, etc, the US found its industrial core hollowed out. This paradox—where the strategy won, but the nation did not—is at the heart of this exploration.

The US led the global shift toward liberalisation and globalisation, embracing free trade, deregulation, and offshoring as strategies for economic growth and competitive advantage. These ideas crystallised during the Reagan-Thatcher era and were institutionalised in policies such as NAFTA and the support for China’s entry into the WTO. The logic was simple: relocate labor-intensive manufacturing to lower-cost countries, focus domestically on high-value services and innovation, and reap the benefits of global efficiency.

For US corps, this approach worked magnificently. Apple built one of the most valuable ecosystems in the world, with tightly integrated design, software, services, and hardware. But much of this hardware was manufactured and assembled overseas, particularly in China. Microsoft dominated software and enterprise services, but its global cloud and platform ecosystem increasingly depended on international data centers, developer networks, and supply chains that were vulnerable to political shifts.

What became apparent over time was that these ecosystem-based strategies—while brilliant in achieving scale, market control, and profitability—were fundamentally fragile. They were built on assumptions of a stable global environment, unrestricted cross-border flows of labour, capital, and data, and a geopolitical consensus that no longer exists. The COVID-19 pandemic, the US-China business war, and the rise of protectionist and nationalist policies globally exposed just how brittle these supply chains and platform dependencies were.

The heart of the flaw is in the over-optimisation for efficiency at the expense of resilience. By offshoring critical manufacturing, the US lost not only jobs but also industrial knowledge, logistics infrastructure, and the ability to rapidly pivot production domestically in times of crisis. This strategic vulnerability became clear when shortages of semiconductors, PPE, and other essentials during the pandemic brought entire industries to a standstill.

Moreover, the US model of capitalism encouraged short-termism. Public companies were driven to maximise quarterly earnings and shareholder returns, often by cutting labor costs or outsourcing rather than reinvesting in domestic capacity. Labor unions weakened significantly, and with them, the political and social infrastructure that once supported a strong working class. The cultural shift toward a “knowledge economy” reinforced the idea that physical production was less valuable than digital platforms, intellectual property, and financial engineering.

This ideology extended into the UK as well, which closely mirrored US strategies in economic liberalization. Under Thatcher in the 1980s, the UK privatized major industries, deregulated finance, crushed unions, and repositioned itself as a global hub for services—especially financial services. The “Big Bang” of 1986 opened up London’s financial markets, turning the City into a magnet for global capital. Much like the US, the U.K. allowed its manufacturing base to atrophy in favour of high-value services concentrated in the Southeast, particularly London.

However, the UK, unlike the US, lacked the scale, resource diversity, and global technological dominance to buffer the negative effects of this transition. The result was stark regional inequality, declining productivity, and chronic underinvestment in infrastructure and education in much of the country. Brexit, in many ways, was the political expression of this economic alienation—a rebellion against globalisation, centralisation, and the perception of being “left behind.”

In both countries, we see a core contradiction: while companies triumphed globally, the broader national economies suffered from fragility, inequality, and a loss of sovereignty in key strategic sectors. The ecosystem-based strategies of firms like Apple and Microsoft continue to generate massive returns, but they do so by depending on fragile geopolitical arrangements, low-cost labor overseas, and complex, just-in-time logistics networks that are increasingly prone to disruption.

The irony is that ecosystems, as conceptualised in nature, thrive on diversity, redundancy, and mutual support. Business ecosystems, as built by the tech giants, often lack these qualities. They tend toward centralisation, dominance, and efficiency, making them look more like monocultures than true ecosystems. When stress hits—in the form of sanctions, pandemics, or trade wars—these systems do not bend; they break.

So is the ecosystem model flawed? Not entirely. It remains one of the most powerful frameworks for value creation in a networked economy. But it needs to evolve. Firms must build ecosystems that are not just efficient, but resilient and adaptable. This means diversifying supply chains, investing in local capabilities, supporting the long-term health of partners, and accounting for political and environmental risks.

Nations, too, must rethink their approach. A return to protectionism is not the answer, but neither is blind faith in market liberalism. Strategic sectors must be rebuilt or supported domestically not only for economic competitiveness but for national resilience. Policies must incentivise long-term investment, regional regeneration, and industrial policy aligned with innovation.

Ultimately, the story of the past few decades is not that globalization and liberalization were inherently wrong. Rather, they were applied too narrowly, with too little foresight, and with insufficient regard for the long-term health of national economies. The US and the UK offer lessons—both cautionary and hopeful—for any country navigating the next era of global business, where resilience, sovereignty, and inclusive prosperity will be just as important as efficiency and innovation.

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